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INTRODUCTION
1

There is a vast literature on the Populism movement of the 1890s.
The Populists were the largest and most indigenous political
movement this nation ever witnessed. The movement was large,
radical, exuberant, and organized from below; predominantly,
*

Professor Emeritus, American University, Washington College of Law. This Article
is a chapter from a book in progress by Professor Wechsler entitled, THE FALL AND
RISE OF SECTION 1983. The chapter provides background to the decision by Justice
Oliver Wendell Homes in Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). Burt gratefully
acknowledges the tireless work of his many student research assistants without whom
this project would not have come to fruition.
1. For further reading on Populism in the nineteenth century, see generally JOHN
B. CLARK, POPULISM IN AMERICA (1926); LAWRENCE GOODWYN, DEMOCRATIC PROMISE:
THE POPULIST MOMENT IN AMERICA (1976); ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., AMERICAN
POPULISM: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1877-1898 (1993); WILLIAM ALFRED PEFFER, POPULISM,
ITS RISE AND FALL (Peter Argersinger ed., 1991).
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though not entirely, composed of tillers of the soil; class conscious,
often joined by trade unions and workers of all stripes, widely
composed of women, democratic; in some places, like the Northeast,
little more than a nuisance; in other areas, like some parts of the
2
South and Prairie States, a serious threat to those who governed.
Nothing comes from nowhere, nothing without progenitors. That
was true of Populism and its offspring, the Peoples’ Party. It had
numerous ancestors of various disparate visions.
These post3
4
reconstruction modules included the Grange, the Greenback Party,
5
6
the Union Labor Party, and the Farmers’ Alliance.
2. In examining the causal connections between Populism and “legal”
disenfranchisement of blacks and poor uneducated whites, I have concentrated on
Alabama without intentionally ignoring a multitude of other compelling and related
events in other southern states during the Populist era. I have targeted Alabama for
the following reasons: (a) the availability of a complete and lengthy transcript of
Alabama’s 1901 Constitutional Convention that effectively disenfranchised blacks;
(b) an abundance of fine, and, I’m happy to say, often conflicting scholarly material
on Alabama Populism; (c) Alabama had, I believe, one of the most powerful Populist
movements in the South, seriously threatening its Bourbon ruling elite; (d) Alabama
Populists managed to develop various credible and respectful ways of working with
blacks, though not without wrenching conflicts; (e) Alabama was the first state to
adopt a “fighting grandfather” clause; (f) an important case, Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S.
475 (1903), involving among other things, Alabama’s newly enacted grandfather
clause, was decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1903; and (g) none other
than the august Honorable Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., fresh to the United States
Supreme Court bench, wrote the Giles majority opinion, a veritable judicial
shipwreck, sometimes overlooked by thoughtful Supreme Court observers and
Holmes aficionados.
3. The Grange, or the Order of Patrons of Husbandry, was a progressive
agricultural organization formed on December 4, 1867 in Washington, D.C. For
further reading on the Grange, see generally CHARLES GARDNER, THE GRANGE, FRIEND
OF THE FARMER: A CONCISE REFERENCE HISTORY OF AMERICA’S OLDEST FARM
ORGANIZATION, AND THE ONLY RURAL FRATERNITY IN THE WORLD, 1867-1947 (1949);
DENNIS S. NORDIN, RICH HARVEST: A HISTORY OF THE GRANGE, 1867-1900 (1974).
4. The Greenback Party was a political organization formed in 1874 to promote
currency expansion. The members were primarily farmers from the West and the
South who supported inflation of currency values in order to wipe out farm debts.
The Greenback Party eventually dispersed and its members became figures in the
Union Labor Party and the Populist Party. For further reading about the Greenback
Party, see generally SIMON NEWCOMB, A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF OUR FINANCIAL POLICY
DURING THE SOUTHERN REBELLION (Michael Hudson ed., 1974); GRETCHEN RITTER,
GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTI-MONOPOLY TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF
FINANCE IN AMERICA (1997); IRWIN UNGER, THE GREENBACK ERA: A SOCIAL AND
POLITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN FINANCE, 1865-1879 (1964).
5. After the Greenback Party disappeared, there were attempts to reorganize
under labor leadership. In 1887, members of the Grange, the Greenbackers, and
Farmers’ Alliance held a convention to organize the National Union Labor Party.
Soon after, the Greenback-Labor Party, an intermediate step in the dissolution of the
Greenback Party, declared itself dissolved. The Party’s platform opposed land
monopoly, contract and Chinese labor, and favored a graduated income tax and
direct election of Senators. See WILLIAM WARREN ROGERS, THE ONE-GALLUSED
REBELLION 125-30 (2001).
6. After the Civil War, southern farmers saw much hardship as their economic
mainstay, cotton, dropped dramatically in price. In September 1877, farmers
gathered in Texas to discuss their situation and began the National Farmers’ Alliance
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*****
During the political storms that swept the South from 1886 to 1896,
the Farmers’ Alliance, quickly succeeded by the more politically
minded and powerful Populists, shook the pillars of the ruling house,
7
which consisted of the “Redeemers,” the Democratic Party, the
8
Bourbons, the southern oligarchy, and the black belt aristocracy.
This overlapping ruling combination had reigned in the South since
the end of Reconstruction. The Populist challengers were primarily
those in financial straits. They were, predominantly, small landowning farmers, tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and laborers, urban
and rural. They were white, and they were black. They were men,
and they were women.
For those days and in many respects, for these days too, theirs was a
radical program: public ownership of railroads and utilities; a
graduated income tax; meaningful debtor relief; popular election of
President and Senators; a free and fair ballot honestly counted;
powerful farm cooperatives; national treasury assistance to farmers at
low interest rates; increased monetary supply; reapportionment of
political units; federal public works programs; and more. They
vigorously condemned, among other things, corporate monopoly,
“ring rule,” convict labor, high interest rates, national banks, private
police, under-taxation of wealth, railroad depredations, and
corporate corruption of state and local legislative bodies. Many
Populists had in mind establishing a society much healthier and more
democratic than that which they (or the nation) had ever witnessed.
Frightened southern elites excoriated these Populists as “anarchistic,”
and Industrial Union, more commonly referred to as the Southern Farmers’
Alliance. For further reading on the Southern Farmers’ Alliance, see generally DONNA
A. BARNERS, FARMERS IN REBELLION: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SOUTHERN FARMERS’
ALLIANCE AND THE PEOPLE’S PARTY IN TEXAS (1984); W.L. GARVIN & J.O. DAWS, HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS’ ALLIANCE AND COOPERATIVE UNION OF AMERICA (1887);
ROBERT C. MCMATH, JR., POPULIST VANGUARD: A HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN FARMERS’
ALLIANCE (1975).
7. “Redeemers” and “redemption” were part of the terminology—nicely attuned
to southern religion—invoked by conservative Democratic party leaders in ridding
the South of Reconstruction in the first half of the 1870s. As in salvation, the
“Redeemers,” as they saw it, had “saved” the South from the combined wicked evils of
northern vindictiveness, the Republican Party, carpetbaggers, scalawags, corruption,
and “Negro domination.”
8. See ALLEN JOHNSTON GOING, BOURBON DEMOCRACY IN ALABAMA 1874-1890, at v
(1951) (explaining that many historians use the term “Bourbon” as a name for
southern democratic leaders who resisted Reconstruction policies and took power in
the South after Reconstruction). The term was originally used by Radicals during
Reconstruction to describe the ultraconservatives in southern society. Id. Its history
harks back to the French royal family reigning intermittently in France and
elsewhere on the continent from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 224 (3d ed. 1996).
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“communistic,” “ignorant,” “vicious,” and “nigger-loving,” along with
a spate of other scurrilities.
Populists, coming out of the Farmers’ Alliance in the late 1880s,
turned to politics when their plans for cooperatives, money, credit,
banking, and transportation, failed to ease their economic woes
significantly. The political structures they built varied from state to
state, depending upon local conditions and local leadership. In some
states, it was a new party, the Peoples’ Party, in which Populists chose
to spike their staff and unfurl their banners. In other states, Populists
stayed in the Democratic Party, creating a progressive wing within it
for the announced purpose of capturing it from their overlords: the
Bourbons, who dominated the Party. In Alabama, the Jeffersonian
Democrats, the reform wing of the Democratic Party, existed side by
9
side with the Peoples’ Party.
As challengers of the existing order, the Populists developed a
keen understanding of the necessity to form coalitions with other
groups who also were being excluded from power and lacked
meaningful control over their own existence. They built strategic
coalitions with labor, with blacks, and, subject to time, place, and
conditions, with Republicans (or black Republicans), Democrats,
Socialists, labor parties, Greenbackers, Prohibitionists, and
Independents. Nor did the Populists fail to include in their numbers
the majority of adult Americans who, for the most part, could not
vote at all: women.
These were hard times, and the distressed reached out to each
other for support. This coming together, this sharing of experiences,
this search for solutions by people barely eking out a living,
scratching the earth, fretting over cotton, floundering in debt, this
questioning of the inevitability of existing arrangements, proved
increasingly threatening to the Bourbons. Moreover, here was a
growing breed, restive whites—Alliancemen, Populists—no longer so
politically paralyzed by Bourbon myths about Reconstruction, black
domination, and Redemption, to catch the nearest way. Here was a
politically emboldened species, many of its leaders now daring to
offend southern mores and Bourbon power by appealing to blacks
for support, joining with them at times in incipient alliances, however
9. Republicans were not liked in the South because of their role in
Reconstruction policy. Every Alabama state official elected between 1874 and 1892
was a Democrat. When Reuben Kolb, a leader of the Farmers’ Alliance, sought the
1890 Democratic nomination for governor, the state Democratic Party used
fraudulent tactics to defeat him. These events led Alliance supporters to form the
Jeffersonian Democratic Party in 1892, which nominated Kolb for governor against
Democratic nominee Thomas Goode Jones. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 161, 213-16.
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spotty, tentative, and inconsistent. Quite a remarkable feat, this
sporadic bi-racial coalition, blemishes and all, occurring a mere
twenty-five years after a bloody Civil War.
Certainly, the Populist coalition had its gnawing differences. Sharp
quarrels occurred over the ultimately defeated legislation forwarded
by Henry Cabot Lodge in 1890 that provided for supervision of
10
federal elections.
Additionally, the (white) Farmers’ Alliance
opposed the 1891 cotton-pickers’ strike, organized and supported by
various members of its organizational ally, the Colored Farmers’
11
Alliance. The shifting and loose black/white Populist relationship
somehow roughly managed to ride out these weaknesses until the
ultimate collapse of Populism with the fatal presidential election of
12
1896. In the interim, this restive racial association engaged in a
shared endeavor to overcome an economic system and its partner,
the government, which kept so many people, both white and black,
poor, overworked, undereducated, and politically impotent. The
alliance sought to replace this system with what the Populists liked to
call the “cooperative commonwealth.” I agree with the conclusion of
Gene Clanton that:
Populists, despite a gale of criticism and outrageous
misrepresentation, fought the good fight; they mounted what was,
at least until the civil rights movement five decades later, the most
significant mass democratic movement in American history, an
extraordinary effort that continues, nearly a century later, to
13
inspire and fascinate.

I do not wish to leave the impression that southern blacks flocked
headlong into the Populist Party, abandoning the party of Lincoln in
droves, or severed all political connections with the Democratic Party
with its veneer of protective paternalism. But many blacks were in
10. See Henry Cabot Lodge, The Coming Congress, 149 N. AM. REV. 293, 297-99
(1889) (indicating that “[t]here can be almost as little question of the expediency of
a simple but efficient statute which shall make federal election as honest as possible
. . . for it would greatly reduce, if not entirely prevent, violence, fraud, false counting,
and the use of money for corrupt purposes.”).
11. The Colored Farmers’ Alliance was organized in Texas on December 11,
1886, and led by General R. M. Humphry, a white man. The Alliance may have
evolved from secret rural societies. In 1891, the total membership of the Alliance was
estimated at 1.2 million. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 141. For further reading about the
Colored Farmers’ Alliance, see generally Martin Dann, Black Populism: A Study of the
Colored Farmers’ Alliance through 1891, 2 J. ETHNIC STUD. 58 (1974).
12. See ROGERS, supra note 5, at 318-30 (highlighting that in 1896, the Populists
nominated William Jennings Bryan, as did the Democratic Party, against Republican
William McKinley).
Infighting within the Populist Party, illustrated by the
controversial nomination of the Bryan ticket, eventually led to dissolution. Id.
13. GENE CLANTON, POPULISM, THE HUMANE PREFERENCE IN AMERICA 1890-1900 xiv
(1991).
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fact more receptive to the Populists and their program than they were
14
to the lily-white southern Republicans and the Democratic Party of
the black belt Bourbons.
In some places, like North Carolina, Populists were highly
15
successful. In other southern states, like Florida and Arkansas, their
16
impact was less. In Alabama, on which we focus our attention, the
Populists enjoyed important electoral and legislative victories,
notwithstanding losses in three bitterly fought battles for the
17
governorship.
The southern Populists, for almost a decade,
mounted a fierce, hydra-headed challenge to the Democratic Party,
to the southern oligarchy, and to the political/economic order they
fashioned.
What made the Bourbons particularly apprehensive was that in this
struggle over power, blacks regained a modest measure of the
political significance they lost with the collapse of Reconstruction. In
this new era of the Populist challenge, blacks now held an allimportant balance of power. In Alabama, for instance, blacks
18
constituted forty-five percent of the population.
It is true that
through intimidation and violence, black voting in Alabama, as well
as elsewhere in the South, declined substantially after
Reconstruction. However, the black vote always remained a force.
The political parties vied for that vote. One persistent suitor, the
Democratic Party, seemingly oblivious to the striking contradiction of
being the sworn party of white supremacy, while simultaneously
courting the black vote, tried at first to keep the black vote out of the
Republican column, later to sway it from the Populist cause.
Ironically, it was in the “black belt” where blacks outnumbered whites
and where the preponderance of Alabama’s conservative forces
14. The Republican Party was divided into two factions—the “black and tans” and
the “lily whites.” The black and tans felt that the blacks were the mainstay of the
Republican Party in the South and thus supported voting rights for blacks. The lily
whites felt that blacks did not fit into a party that represents “intelligence, progress
and higher civilization.” MALCOLM COOK MCMILLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
IN ALABAMA: A STUDY IN POLITICS, THE NEGRO, AND SECTIONALISM 261 (1955).
15. Other southern states—Texas, Georgia, Louisiana, and Alabama along with
some Western and Great Plains states had significant populist movements. CARL
DEGLER, THE OTHER SOUTH: SOUTHERN DISSENTERS IN THE 19TH CENTURY 320 (1982).
16. Id.
17. The Populists, together with the Jeffersonian Democrats, nominated Kolb for
governor in the 1890, 1892, and 1894 elections. Historians believe that Kolb actually
received more votes than were counted, but black belt Democrats stuffed ballot
boxes to ensure a Democratic victory. Despite the repeated defeats, Populists were
elected to more than a third of the seats in the state legislature, two congressional
seats, and to many county offices. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 217-28, 271-86.
18. See MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 264 (indicating that blacks, with a population
over 800,000, constituted a large minority of the state’s population).

WESCHLER.PRINTER.DOC

2002]

12/4/2002 1:38 PM

POPULISM, RACE, AND CLASS

29

resided, that the Bourbons were able to maintain state power against
reform, defeat black aspirations, and stave off the Populist menace by
19
means of rank fraud and manipulation of the black vote.
The time arrived, however, when the forces of aristocracy no
longer wished to rely on fraud and manipulation of the black vote to
capture one election after another. The Populist agenda was too
dangerous, Populist appeal too popular, Populist growth too
alarming, and the enormity of the black belt vote fraud too
embarrassing for the Bourbons to shoulder. And, worst of all, the
perils of Populism were compounded greatly by Populists’ courting
blacks on issues dear to them but unwelcome by their overlords, like
improving blacks’ (along with whites’) miserable economic existence,
and purifying the electoral process, which to blacks meant not only
the right to vote but to have their votes counted fairly. These goals
gave blacks, as individuals, a deep sense of personal pride; and, at the
same time, gave blacks, as a community, a solid piece of political
power.
To many in the establishment—the Democratic Party, Bourbons,
black belt aristocrats, bankers, affluent merchants, railroad and other
corporations, as well as their lawyers—the situation was intolerable. It
called for drastic measures to bedevil the current Populist scourge
and to inoculate the body politic from the threat of any similar
plague in the future. In Alabama, as in many other states, the black
belt led the way.
The Bourbons felt a solution lay in further manipulation of the
electoral system. The electorate had to be pruned of those
constituting a major part of the threat: the poor, the uneducated,
those without property, and the indebted. Additionally, the pruning
needed to be substantial if political dominance was to be assured.
New voting prerequisites provided the key by addressing two prime
20
attributes of class, wealth and education.
It is important to
understand what else the southern disenfranchisers contemplated.
They also hoped to snatch the ballot away from those economically
desperate whites, backs to the wall, to whom the Populist message was
alluring, and from whose ranks had sprung an imposing collective
resistance to Bourbon rule. Thus, in the ensuing assault on the
ballot, the class and race of the quarry were intertwined.
19. Money, alcohol, and intimidation were used to influence voters. Ballot boxes
were stolen to ensure that the Democratic candidates won over Populists. Id. at 21920, 230; ROGERS, supra note 5, at 222-24.
20. By alluding to class, I do not mean to understate the significance of race and
the special devastation inflicted on black suffrage, as well as all other facets of black
life, by an endemic racism of national proportions.
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THE 1901 ALABAMA SUFFRAGE PLAN

On November 11, 1900, the Alabama electorate adopted a new
state Constitution along with the new suffrage provision it contained.
The Constitution was proclaimed to be in effect on November 28,
1901. Nothing in this document played a more important role than
21
suffrage issues. At the core of the suffrage issues lay the literacy,
property, and grandfather clauses.
Against the backdrop of southern reality, the new suffrage
prerequisites might more accurately be characterized, not as property
and literacy, but as wealth and education. To exclude field and
factory workers, “the downwardly mobile and geographically
transient,” on the move in search of employment, voter registration
would now turn on such class characteristics as minimum property
holdings; ability to pay poll taxes; uninterrupted employment;
literacy; recondite constitutional interpretation; and lengthy fixed
22
residence.
Under the newly proposed electoral regime, wealth meant property
holdings. Literacy, with variations, meant the ability to read and
write. Literacy is a creature of education and education is historically
interlocked with class. At the turn of the century, education was
highly improbable for the offspring of southern white or black
sharecroppers or the urban poor. Many southern states spent a
pittance on public education. Child labor was rampant, often
essential to the most meager level of survival for countless families.
Pre-pubescent and adolescent children toiled day and night in textile
23
mills. Others stayed home to work the farm. For those reasons,
southern illiteracy ran high.
Blacks, only recently emerged from slavery and still oppressed by its
conspicuous vestiges, were the poorest and least educated of the
southern populace. Accordingly, the disenfranchising plan, so
riveted on class, would unquestionably hit them the hardest. But
poor and poorly educated whites, also large in numbers, would likely
suffer the same fate, for Bourbon Democrats were determined to rid
the election rolls of them too. Bourbons repeated over and over
again, like a catechism, that the ballot belonged to the “intelligent
21. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, §§ 177, 180, 181.
22. GEORGE TINDALL, THE PERSISTENT TRADITION IN NEW SOUTH POLITICS 40
(1975).
23. See WILLIAM MABRY, THE NEGRO IN NORTH CAROLINA POLITICS SINCE
RECONSTRUCTION 74 (1940) (explaining that in 1903, South Carolina, taking a
progressive leap forward, passed a law forbidding employers from hiring children
under the age of twelve and limiting the working hours of children age twelve
through seventeen to sixty-six hours a week).
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24

and virtuous,” not to the “ignorant and vicious.” In that respect, the
color of the voter cut no great divide. In fact, poor whites may have
constituted the graver danger. As serious a pestilence as independent
black voters were to the Democratic Party, it was a majority white
Alliance/Populist movement that convulsed the South for almost a
decade and came close to toppling the Bourbons from power.
Poor whites understood well enough that wealth and education
requirements were likely to cause them, as well as blacks, to lose their
right to vote. It was precisely for that reason that they defeated
similar proposals to limit suffrage in Alabama when that state
25
adopted its 1867 Constitution, showing such strength in victory that
the issue was not even raised when Alabama adopted its 1875
26
Constitution.
Nevertheless, Alabama’s radical Bourbons, persevering, tried to call
a constitutional convention on the same issue in 1892. That bid also
27
failed and for the same reason.
Moreover, to many northern
Alabama whites, scant of money, arable land, and formal education,
the notorious thirteenth plank in Alabama’s Democratic Party
platform of 1892 left the party’s intentions undisguised: “We favor the
passage of such election laws as will better secure the government of
the state in the hands of the intelligent and virtuous and will enable
28
every elector to cast his ballot secretly and without fear of restraint.”
Alabama Populists would not let plank thirteen fade in people’s
memory.
Faced with the perils of Populism, the Bourbons had to find some
way to induce whites in Alabama, as in the rest of the South, to
approve a plan limiting suffrage to the affluent and educated, thus
disenfranchising most blacks, and, in the process, an untold number
24. See 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
STATE OF ALABAMA 2875, 2958, 3022, 3093, 3282, 3333 (1901) [hereinafter OFFICIAL
PROCEEDINGS]; MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 268 (quoting John B. Knox, Chairman of
the Democratic State Executive Committee and delegate from Alabama to the
Democratic National Convention in 1892 and 1896, as saying that the primary reason
for the disenfranchisement of blacks was to establish “white supremacy by law”
because “[t]here is in the white man an inherited capacity for government, which is
wholly wanting in the Negro . . . [t]he Negro . . . is descended from a race lowest in
intelligence and moral perceptions of all the races of man.”).
25. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 135-50.
26. Id. at 189-210.
27. Id. at 249-54.
28. Id. at 249-50 (citing MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 9, 1892). Republicans
also favored changes in the electoral system. See Lodge, supra note 10, at 299
(discussing the possibility of using state election strategies or the Australian system as
a model for a federal election law). The secret, or Australian ballot, was devised to
work against illiterates by failing to identify candidates by party and, as in Virginia,
requiring people to vote in two and one-half minutes. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at
220 n.15.
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of white voters. The idea of white supremacy supplied a good part of
the methodology. White supremacy always constituted the white
south’s critical and familiar battle cry during Reconstruction and
post-Reconstruction. The core of the doctrine was that blacks were
innately and unalterably inferior and for that reason, should never be
permitted to govern. Rather, blacks must always be governed by
whites and (with an important addendum, whether explicit or
implicit) for the benefit of white people. To disenfranchise blacks,
therefore, and to “take back the South,” an even more vociferous call
rang out for white supremacy. So it was that white supremacist
29
oratory permeated the air as never before.
It was not that difficult for the South’s ruling elite to promote
white supremacy among poor white southern throngs. During
slavery, impoverished whites might console themselves with the belief
30
they were blessed with the “badges of supremacy,” a status they
viewed as infinitely superior to the slaves toiling about them. As we
know, after slavery came to an end, many of the “badges and
incidents of slavery” still endured for black Americans. However,
many of the badges of supremacy also lingered among ordinary white
people. Recognizing the contradictions inherent in the relationship
between blacks and poor whites, the southern Bourbons astutely
continued to pursue white supremacy with particular emphasis on
poor whites. The tactic did not prove ineffective as class frequently
31
bows to color. Surveying our own history, anti-black sentiment has
too often prevailed, its beneficiaries most frequently those at the top
of the scale, not those at the bottom.

29. The following examples were typical. When Democrats succeeded in
replacing the Republicans in Baltimore in 1899, they used the slogan “This is a White
Man’s City.” MARGARET LAW COLLCOTT, THE NEGRO IN MARYLAND POLITICS 99 (1969).
Maryland’s Democratic candidate for Governor, Edwin Warfield, articulated the
mantra of white supremacy in no uncertain terms:
This election is a contest for the supremacy of the white voters in
Maryland. . . . The elevation of the Negro is a well-nigh hopeless task, so long
as they exercise like dumb, driven cattle, solidly and without intelligence or
reason, their right of suffrage as a weapon of offense against the Democratic
party, directed and guided by Republican politicians. . . . The white man is
the highest type of human family; the Negro is the lowest. God has made no
other race equal of the Caucasian, and neither amendments to the
Constitution nor anything else can do what God had failed to do: that is,
make the negro the equal of the white man.
Id. at 107-08.
30. William A. Brewer, Poor Whites and Negroes in the South Since The Civil War, 15 J.
NEGRO HIST. 26, 27 (1930).
31. See generally R. HUCKFELDT & C. KOHFELD, RACE AND THE DECLINE OF CLASS IN
AMERICAN POLITICS (1989).
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The more successful the efforts of southern blacks and whites to
work together politically in the late 1880s and 1890s, the more
disconcerted and desperate the Bourbons became, substantially
increasing their efforts to crush the opposition. For instance, in the
1890s, the relaxed racial attitudes of Arkansas Populists, compared
with the Democrats, prompted the Democratic Arkadelphia Siftings
to predict that “[t]his is a white man’s country, and white men are
going to rule it, and when the third party opened its arms to the
Negro at its state convention, it invited its certain death at the polls
32
next fall.”
Public speakers and the North Carolina Democratic Party pressed
the white supremacy issue, even forming white supremacy clubs. The
attack worked well. In 1898, the Democratic Party defeated the once
successful fusion between the Populists and the Republicans. The
News and Observer quoted the Chairman of the Democratic Party, who
exclaimed that “North Carolina is a WHITE MAN’S state and WHITE
MEN will rule it, and they will crush the party of Negro domination
beneath a majority so overwhelming that no other party will ever dare
33
to attempt to establish Negro rule here.”
Robert Aldrich, the Chairman of the 1895 South Carolina
Constitutional Convention, lambasted South Carolina’s 1868
Constitution that granted blacks the right to vote, saying it was “made
by aliens, negroes and natives without character, all the enemies of
South Carolina, and . . . designed to degrade our State, insult our
34
people and overturn our civilization.”
And in Alabama, after being elected governor in 1890, Thomas
Goode Jones editorialized that “it is [in] the Black Belt that the
35
necessity for Caucasian supremacy is most keenly felt.”
Joseph
Johnston, after his 1896 nomination for governor of Alabama,
declaimed:
We do not believe in surrendering any section of our state to the
control of the Negro . . . [for that] would be fatal alike to the peace
and prosperity of both races. We have no hostility for the colored
man . . . but we do not believe he is fitted by birth, education or
32. John Graves, Negro Disenfranchisement in Arkansas, 26 ARK. HIST. Q. 199, 205
(1967), in 6 RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN HISTORY 221 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1992).
33. MABRY, supra note 23, at 49 (citing NEWS AND OBSERVER, Nov. 3, 1898).
34. Laughlin McDonald, An Aristocracy of Voters: The Disenfranchisement of Blacks in
South Carolina, 37 S.C. L. REV. 557, 570 (1986) (quoting JOURNAL OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 1, 1-2 (1895)).
35. Rogers, supra note 5, at 219. This is the same Thomas Goode Jones, who, a
decade later, when Populism was no longer a credible threat to Alabama’s
Democratic party, opposed that states’ adoption of a grandfather clause because, he
said, it clearly discriminated against blacks otherwise eligible to vote.
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experience, to engage in making or executing laws for the people
36
of Alabama . . . .

The 1896 Alabama Democratic Party convention platform
reinforced this clear goal of creating a steady progression of laws with
the purpose of disenfranchising blacks and ensuring a predictable
electorate: “It is our purpose to maintain a government in Alabama,
37
fair and just to all under control of the white men of Alabama.” In
his splendid book on Alabama’s constitutional development,
Malcolm McMillan unambiguously describes the Democratic Party’s
goal of black and white disenfranchisement in 1901: “[w]ith a
campaign cry of ‘white supremacy’ . . . [and] the support of the
railroads . . . [the conservatives of Alabama] created a greatly reduced
38
electorate with more conservative tendencies than the old.”
All the foregoing illustrates how anxious the Bourbons were to fuel
the flames of racial antagonism, deflate the newly acquired balance of
power blacks had achieved with such arduous struggle, and
undermine that ominous threat from below, the Populists. Ridding
the election rolls of the growing and malignant southern pestilence—
black voters—topped the list of imperatives. It was powerful racist
weaponry. But how was the Bourbon class to accomplish that goal
while simultaneously convincing poor, uneducated whites that their
vote would not be imperiled?
******
This seeming conundrum was resolved by the Bourbons, who
devised several qualifications for voting, among them the ingenious
“grandfather clause,” which bestowed voting eligibility on males
39
whose ancestors had served in the American military. To visualize
the contending forces buffeting the grandfather clause, it is essential
to compare the two different stages of voter registration: the
Permanent and Temporary Plans. They had but one major similarity:
40
only males, twenty-one years or older, could register to vote.
36. Id. at 204-05.
37. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 304.
38. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 363. Ben Tillman, later Governor of South
Carolina, took his stand on white supremacy as a young man and became a member
of the Sweetwater Saber Club. Accoutered with uniforms, guns brandished, its
members were determined to rid the state of all Negro influence at the polls. To
Tillman, it was quite simple, “[t]he Creator made the Caucasian of a better clay than
he made any of the colored people.” FRANCIS BUTLER SIMKINS, THE TILLMAN
MOVEMENT IN SOUTH CAROLINA 39 (1964). In his 1890 gubernatorial inaugural
speech, Tillman was exuberant. “Democracy has won a great victory unparalleled.
The triumph of Democracy and white supremacy over mongrelism and anarchy is
most complete.” Id. at 136-37.
39. See generally infra Part I.B (describing “The Temporary Plan”).
40. After unceasing struggles dating at least as far back as the 1848 New York
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A. The Permanent Plan
The permanent plan began on January 1, 1903, and was, as its title
41
stated, to remain in force permanently thereafter.
Under its
provisions, no male could register to vote in Alabama (assuming he
42
satisfied the residency conditions) unless he met one of two onerous
requirements:
(1) Requirement #1: Literacy and Employment. The applicant
had to be able to read and write any article of the United States
Constitution, and (unless disabled) have worked for the greater part
43
of the year preceding registration; or
(2) Requirement #2: Property Ownership. He or his wife had to
own and reside on at least forty acres of land, or own personal
property, either of which was assessed for taxation purposes at more
44
than $300.00.
Thus, within a year after ratification of Alabama’s proposed
Constitution, literacy and/or property holdings became permanent
prerequisites to voting, impediments to what we consider today as the
indispensable core of anything resembling democratic practice. By
design, voting under Alabama’s permanent plan was prohibitive to
untold thousands of its male voters, black and white, because of
poverty, lack of education, and periodic unemployment.
B. The Temporary Plan
Prior to December 20, 1902, any male could register to vote in
Alabama (assuming he satisfied the residency conditions) if he served
in the military, was the descendant of someone who served in the
military, or was a person of good character and understood the
45
obligations of citizenship. The Alabama electorate approved its new
Constitution on November 11, 1901. The temporary plan lasted 400
days ending on December 19, 1902.
Seneca Falls Convention, women won the right to vote in the Wyoming Territory in
1869, retaining it when Wyoming became a state in 1889. Colorado enfranchised
women in 1893, followed by Utah and Idaho in 1896 and by more states in the first
two decades of the twentieth century. See generally ELLEN DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND
SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT WOMAN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 18481969 (1978); ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1958); JONI LOVENDUSKI & JILL HILLS, THE POLITICS
OF THE SECOND ELECTORATE: WOMEN AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (1981). Finally, the
Nineteenth Amendment, ratified in 1920, prohibited the denial to vote on account
of sex. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
41. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 181.
42. Id. § 177.
43. Id. § 181.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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For uneducated white men with no property, the temporary plan
amounted to relief, perhaps alluring but deceptive, from the harsh
class commands of the permanent plan. The permanent plan
demanded substantial property holdings or both literacy and
uninterrupted employment. The temporary plan contained none of
these limitations. Under the temporary plan, applicants had to meet
one of the three requirements:
(1) Requirement #1: War Veterans. This clause entitled all men to
register who served in the United States Armed Forces during the
War of 1812, the wars with Mexico or Spain, any war with the Indians,
or who served on either the side during the Civil War, or in the
46
National Guard or militia of any state.
(2) Requirement #2: Descendants of War Veterans. If a man was
not a veteran of the enumerated wars, he could still register if he was
a descendant of any veteran of those wars or of the American
47
Revolutionary War. This provision earned the label “grandfather
clause” because it exempted a class of men, overwhelmingly white,
48
from the rigors of the permanent plan, based on preexisting facts.
(3) Requirement #3: Good Character and Understanding. The
restrictions of having a good character and understanding the
responsibilities involved with being a citizen opened the final escape
49
hatch from the permanent plan.
If the aspiring registrant was
neither a veteran nor a descendant of a veteran, he might still qualify
if he was a man of good character who understood the duties and
50
obligations of a citizen under a republican form of government.
Good character by itself was not enough, neither was understanding
the nature of our government. Both elements were prerequisites to
51
qualifying under this section.
The key to the entire temporary plan was the second requirement,
the grandfather clause. It offered the widest possibility for white
registration. The other two clauses were much less promising.
It was anticipated that most white men were not war veterans and
thus could not qualify under the first requirement. “Who constituted
the group in the soldier clause?” a delegate asked and then
responded:

46. Id. § 180.
47. Id.
48. Today’s use of the term “grandfathered” in other contexts has its origins in
the disenfranchising constitutions of the South at the turn of the century.
49. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 180.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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The soldiers of 1812 have passed away and joined the ranks on the
other side. The soldiers in the Indian wars are gone. The soldiers of
the war with Mexico constitute an insignificant class. There are
probably not one hundred of them in Alabama. The soldiers who
served in the Confederate army have mainly crossed over the river.
The average age of the soldier in the Confederate army when he
entered was 35 or 36 years. They entered from 16 to 60. Add to his
then age the thirty-six years that have passed since the war closed and
you have 71. So the man of average age who entered in the
Confederate army has passed beyond his three score years and ten.
52
There are only a few of them left.
The Good Character and Understanding Clause, the third
requirement, was too vague and uncertain. What did “good
character” mean? And exactly what were “the duties and obligations
of citizenship under a republican government” that one was to
understand? Weren’t applicants under this clause at the mercy of
local registrars? Altogether, then, the terms “good character” and
“understanding” were much too standardless to be reassuring to poor
53
and uneducated voters and their advocates.
These severe limitations surrounding the War Veterans and Good
Character and Understanding Clauses made the grandfather clause
(“Descendants of War Veterans”) all the more important. No other
issue during the Convention’s suffrage debates, or in the campaign
for ratification that followed, equaled the barrage of protest aimed at
the grandfather clause. John Knox, Convention President and ardent
supporter of the clause, acknowledged that the “most strenuous
opposition offered to the report of the Committee [was] directed
against that part of the plan commonly known as ‘the grandfather
54
clause.’” He conceded that this part of the plan “has been criticised
and attacked from unexpected sources” and complained that the
55
attack was “intempera[te] . . . and wholly unwarranted.”
The concepts of law and legality enveloped the suffrage debates.
Again and again, the magnetic power of the law impelled delegates of
all political hues to frame and resolve the issues in the time-honored
language of law and in the name of the Constitution.
This was nothing new, of course. The primacy of law infused
political discourse almost from the nation’s beginning. The colonists
were nursed on the Magna Carta and the English common law, and
52.
53.
54.
55.

3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2859-60.
MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 294-95.
3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2915.
Id.
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when the time came, turned against the British themselves. The
written Constitution that ensued, later generations would expound
grandiloquently, was epitomized in John Marshall’s adoration as “a
56
government of laws, not of men.” Marshall’s aphorism would in
time become interchangeable with one of America’s favorite
beatitudes, the “rule of law.” We might label this reverence for the
Constitution, this preoccupation with the idea of Constitution, as
Constitutionalism.
Constitutionalism was not foreign to the people of Alabama. The
1901 gathering in Montgomery constituted that state’s sixth
Constitutional Convention. Constitutionalism, neatly verbalized by
former Governor Jones pervaded this Convention: “I take it that no
serious minded delegate, no delegate devoted to the welfare of his
country . . . wants to adopt any plan which deliberately wars on the
supreme law, and . . . which he believes is in violation of the
57
Constitution of the United States.”
Ironically this focus on Constitutionalism appears to have escaped
some of its most fervent devotees at the Convention. This was
especially true in light of the unrepresentative composition of the
delegates, the undemocratic disenfranchising enterprise on which
they had embarked, and the bestowal of the franchise as a reward for
lamentable past conduct.
The grandfather clause rewarded a particular body of
“descendants.” Along with all the other white inhabitants of this
nation, however, those “descendants,” including all the Convention
delegates, occupied a land that had been wrested from another
people. “The U.S. Cavalry and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
annihilated the Native American population whenever it stood in the
58
way of the expansion of the United States.”
And the U.S.
Constitution broadly empowered Congress to govern those
59
conquered tribes.
Here, at the Alabama Convention where delegates were rewriting
their own state Constitution, no one noted the anomaly of specially
anointing with the democratic right of suffrage, those who had
engaged in that slaughter and theft of the land, those men who were
veterans or the descendants of veterans of “any war with the Indians.”
56. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
57. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2887.
58. W.H. Locke Anderson, Cold Soldiers Never Die, 41 MONTHLY REV. 56, 58-59
(1989) (reviewing T. SMITH, THINKING LIKE A COMMUNIST: STATE AND LEGITIMACY IN
THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, AND CUBA (1987)).
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [3] To regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes.”).
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On this discrete issue, the Suffrage Committee Report succeeded
without debate. It mattered little to the delegates that the clause did
not similarly enfranchise the descendants of the victims of those wars.
Moreover, on whatever other principles the nation was founded, it
was grounded in no small measure on the institution of slavery. The
U.S. Constitution, while managing decorously to shy clear of the
distasteful word “slavery,” shielded slavery and the slave trade from
constitutional amendment for seventy-six years, bolstered the
slaveholding states’ congressional representation by counting three60
fifths of their slaves, and barred a capitation tax.
By the time of the 1901 Alabama Constitutional Convention, no
61
blacks remained in elective office in that state. Of the 155 delegates
to the Convention, none were black. Blacks had even been excluded
from taking part in the conventions or voting in the primaries that
62
selected the delegates to this Constitutional Convention. In fact, the
majority of delegates at this assemblage had convened with the
declared aim of disenfranchising blacks. And they succeeded.
II. PROTECTING THE UNEDUCATED WHITE VOTE
Holy assertions abounded that “not a single white man” would be
disenfranchised. A “grandfather” exception would see to that. Any
man who had an ancestor that served in the American military or in
any American war would be allowed to vote. And there were plenty
of those to look back to. It would be the rare white man who did not
have, or could not imagine, such an ancestor somewhere in his
lineage. Therefore, to vote, white men had only to summon the
grandfather clause to be excused from scaling the twin barriers of
property and education. Not so, however, with most southern black
men. Although many black men fought in past American wars, the
vast majority of southern blacks, freshly emerging from slavery, would
be harder put to find such a “fighting grandfather.”
Manifestly, then, blacks were a prime target of the well-aimed
property and literacy projectiles. They did not own much property,
so they could not qualify under that provision. Additionally, sixty
percent of eligible blacks in Alabama could not meet the reading or
63
writing requirements, automatically disqualifying them. Those who
60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
61. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 3019.
62. Allen Woodrow Jones, A History of the Direct Primary in Alabama 1840-1903,
at 178 (1964) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Univ. of Alabama).
63. See MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 271, 276 (citing Bureau of the Census,
Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900 (Washington, D.C.), I, 970); 6 APPELTON’S
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were literate would probably be eliminated by arcane constitutional
queries put to them by hostile, unelected, white registrars cloaked
with unlimited discretion, who would only be doing the job expected
of them: helping to create an almost totally white male electorate.
With such a consummation, white supremacy would reign again,
blacks would no longer hold a balance of power, electoral fraud
would be eliminated, intra-white acrimony would diminish, and peace
and prosperity would prevail. Such were the broad brush strokes of
the ideas the Bourbons painted as their vision of a southern future.
In Alabama, as in some other southern states, the initial push for
disenfranchisement came from the black belt and the planters who
reigned supreme there. Now at this Convention black belt delegates
urged one of their numbers, Richard Jones, a Suffrage Committee
member, to address the assemblage on behalf of the grandfather
clause.
They had chosen wisely: Confederate officer, former
president of the University of Alabama, lawyer, constitutional law
professor, president of the State Bar, and—down-home racist to boot.
Accepting his charge, Jones stoutly defended the clause, linking it, in
a flight of cloying oratory, to white illiteracy. “I was astonished,” he
said, “to see how many of those [Alabama] soldiers [who I
commanded during the Civil War] could not read [or] write [or] sign
their names, and yet I declare to you there were no better soldiers in
the Army . . . than those Alabamians who had patriotically gone out
64
to defend the principles of the South on the battlefields . . . .”
When these men came home from the war, Jones continued, they
65
“wanted to educate their children” but could not.
I have heard some of them say, “If I just had the means to send my
children to school and give them the advantages of an education, it
would have been the very joy of my life, but I didn’t have the means
to do it, and I had to put them to work.” These children are of the
same stock of the soldiers of whom I have spoken, and my right
arm should be palsied before I would do anything to prevent them
66
taking part in the government of Alabama.

By interjecting formal education into the grandfather clause
debate, Jones presumably hoped to allay white fears of white
disenfranchisement aroused by the new literacy test that required

ANN. CYCLOPEDIA 665 (3d ser. 1901) (indicating that of the 181,345 black males of
voting age, only 73,399 were literate). Only fourteen percent of white males could
not meet the requirements. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 276.
64. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2881-82.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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registrants to read and write any part of the Constitution.
To
thousands of uneducated, functionally illiterate white men, Jones
thus portrayed himself as proud protector of their embattled ballot.
Yet ironically it was their ballots to which he and his disenfranchising
Bourbon allies, in another part of the suffrage plank—the literacy
68
clause—had just laid a devastating siege. As history later played
itself out, the grandfather clause, to whose aid Jones scurried, did
precious little to lift that siege. Rather, two-thirds of a century would
pass before Congress, in the 1965 Voting Rights Act, finally liberated
the ballot from the suffocating literacy test.
Leaving no doubt of his intentions, Jones affirmed his credentials
as adulator of the color white, one who would prefer to have his
“right arm . . . palsied” than to disenfranchise confederate soldiers’
children. In stark contrast, however, he then proclaimed: “I would
just as soon give a toddling child a razor in his hand expecting him
not to hurt himself, as to expect the negro to use the ballot and not
use it to his injury and to ours. [For] God Almighty has made [the
black man] different from the white man. You had just as well try
to . . . legislate a Negro into a white man . . . It is impossible to do
69
it.”
The grandfather clause thus became the lubricant of Alabama’s
suffrage strategy. Property and literacy clauses were to obliterate the
black vote. Without some relief, the same destiny awaited thousands
of poor uneducated white men and ratification was hopeless without
assurance that this would not occur. The grandfather clause was to
provide the guarantee. As events unfolded, however, the grandfather
clause assumed a very different primal function. It safeguarded the
white man’s vote in order to muster that vote in favor of ratifying a
suffrage plan, geared to wealth and education, which would in due
time and by design also wipe out much of the unaffluent, uneducated
white male vote. That was the crowning irony of the grandfather
clause.
The grandfather clause met powerful opposition, not only from
blacks, but for clashing reasons. Whites, Populists, and Republicans
resisted, some because it discriminated against blacks, but most
because they understood that the grandfather clause, limited to a one
year registration period, would not ultimately save the bulk of the
67. See id. at 289 (describing other delegates’ support for the grandfather clause
based upon the necessity to exempt the sons of Confederate soldiers who were
illiterate because of the “fortunes of war”).
68. See id. at 349-50 (noting passage of the literacy requirement amendment, with
Richard Jones voting in support).
69. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2880-81.
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white vote from the ravages of the disenfranchising scheme. Some
members of the ruling elite also fought the grandfather clause
because they thought it unconstitutional, a reversion to English
hereditary privilege, unfair to blacks, or too permissive in allowing
lower class whites to vote.
********
No one at the Convention, as far as we know, was poor or
uneducated. The delegates included twelve bankers, ninety-five
lawyers (many of whom represented railroads and other corporate
interests), four journalists, and numerous doctors, engineers and
70
teachers.
Sixty-two delegates were college graduates and twenty71
eight had finished at least a year of college. A powerful core at this
all-white gathering was determined to disenfranchise poor
uneducated white men. They succeeded.
During the steaming hot summer months of July and August 1901,
the Montgomery Convention Hall walls reverberated with stentorian
male voices on the future of suffrage. No women sat in attendance as
delegates, nor did they occupy the floor, rather they watched from
distant galleries, powerless, mere observers of the scene. To the
highly influential Montgomery Advertiser, the leading Bourbon
newspaper in the state, the May opening of the Convention
presented a quaint and lovely vision. “The galleries had filled to
overflowing with beautiful women and brave men and was an
72
attractive picture to look upon.” Southern sentimental stereotypes
of pretty belles notwithstanding, women did not hold any elective
public office in Alabama; neither could they vote in Alabama, nor
anywhere else in the union. Undaunted by prohibitive odds against
success, women suffragists mustered their forces and resolutely
petitioned the all-male Constitutional Convention to enfranchise the
73
74
women of Alabama. The women did not succeed.
Against this backdrop of undemocratic representation and
intentions, the Convention nevertheless resonated with learned legal
precedent and glowing constitutional oratory. If the commanding
culture of law and Constitution were not enough to imbue the
70. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 263 (citing MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, June 25,
1901 and July 30, 1901).
71. Id.
72. MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, May 22, 1901, at 1.
73. See MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 278-79 (indicating that although the Suffrage
Committee did not give serious consideration to suffrage for women, Virginia Clay
Clopton and Frances Griffin petitioned the Convention on behalf of the female
voting rights, garnering a few male delegate supporters).
74. See id. (noting that the women’s suffrage measure was defeated by a vote of 87
to 22) (citing 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 3873-74).
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Convention with the spirit of Constitutionalism, the presence of
ninety-five lawyers (many of them luminaries in the law), comprising
sixty-one percent of the 155 delegates, would certainly achieve that
result. And on the issue of the grandfather clause, the focus on
Constitutionalism animated the debate.
The grandfather clause, pivotal to the disenfranchising plan,
galvanized the most formidable resistance to the Suffrage
Committee’s majority report. In an aura of Constitutionalism, the
protest probed, more than did any other issue the Convention had to
face, the very meaning of the Constitution and, more particularly, the
future of the Fifteenth Amendment.
A. The Minority Report: Opposition to the Grandfather Clause
Disenfranchisement, grandfather clause and all, was the disfigured
offspring of the Bourbons, lords of the New South and Democratic
Party, accosted of late by a bunch of discontented, disrespectful
Populists, an ambitious lot that spoke to power, not as supplicants,
but as contenders for the throne. Yet a minority of Bourbons, some
eminent, spurned the grandfather clause and waged a battle royal
against it, yielding only at the last moment when the entire suffrage
75
plan came up for final vote.
Better, they no doubt ultimately
concluded, to live with a grandfather clause confined solely to
current (not prospective) poor, ignorant, white male voters than to
see the Bourbons’ complete disenfranchising plan, their grand
blueprint for a politically sustainable future, go down to ignominious
defeat.
Four Suffrage Committee members, Frank White, George
Harrison, William Oates, and Stanley Dent, all Bourbons, all
76
prestigious, all Confederate veterans, issued a minority report
condemning the grandfather clause in resounding terms.
[The grandfather clause] violates the Federal Constitution . . . . It
undertakes, by indirect means, to deny or abridge the right to vote
to citizens of the United States, on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude, which is forbidden by the Fifteenth
Amendment . . . . The clause . . . does not erect a standard of
qualifications applicable to both races, but establishes an arbitrary
standard, which, considered in connection with the history of the
country, confers the right of suffrage on members of the white race
(who are descendants of such soldiers) and denies it to members of
the black race, who are not such descendants . . . . It establishes a
75. Id. at 295.
76. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 1264-66.
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permanent, hereditary, governing class, which is undemocratic,
77
unrepublican, and un-American.

In addition to this foursome, a number of other prominent
delegates took the floor to combat the grandfather clause, often
eloquently, and for various reasons. Two compelling critiques, not
easily overcome, branded the cause, first as unconstitutional, and
second, as suffrage by heredity.
First in importance was the charge that the clause violated the
Fifteenth Amendment prohibition against abridging the right to vote
78
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The
majority of southern white males, but only a small percentage of
southern black males, qualified under the grandfather clause. Of
79
course, blacks participated in large numbers in prior American wars.
80
An estimated 5,000 free blacks served in the Revolutionary War.
Two black battalions helped defeat the British at New Orleans in the
81
War of 1812. Black regiments also fought in many battles during
82
the Mexican War.
During the Civil War, approximately 186,000
blacks served in the Union Army and 26,000 in the Union Navy—
83
212,000 blacks in all; 16 of them received the Medal of Honor; 75 to
100 were commissioned officers; 38,000 black soldiers died in the
84
carnage of that war.
This does not tell the full military story of southern blacks, most of
whom were slaves at the start of the Civil War. Unlike free blacks,
slaves were never admitted into the military as fighting soldiers. Of
the 212,000 black servicemen who fought in the Civil War, only
93,000 came from the seceding states; less than five percent of the
77. Id. at 1265-66.
78. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1, 2 (providing that “[t]he right of citizens of
the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any state on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude” and that
“[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”).
79. See generally TRACY BARNETT, THE BUFFALO SOLDIERS (2002); JACK D. FONER,
BLACKS AND THE MILITARY IN AMERICAN HISTORY: A NEW PERSPECTIVE (1974).
80. JOHN H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO
AMERICANS 135 (6th ed. 1988); DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW
11 (2d ed. 1992).
81. FRANKLIN, supra note 80, at 100-01.
82. Black military regiments, called Buffalo Soldiers, fought along the Western
frontier and the border with Mexico. In July of 1866, Congress approved legislation
creating six all black regiments to serve in the peace time armies of the United
States. They consisted of the 9th and 10th Calvary and the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 41st
Infantry. See, e.g., The Buffalo Soldiers, at http://www.toptags.com/aama/bio/
groups/buff.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2002). Cf. Alvin J. Schexnider, The Development
of Racial Solidarity in the Armed Forces, 5 J. BLACK STUD. 415, 417-18 (1975) (noting that
blacks have participated in every American war).
83. FRANKLIN, supra note 80, at 286.
84. Id. at 290.
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almost four and a half million blacks held in slavery in 1860, when
85
the war began. As the Union Army fought their way into the South,
thousands of slaves escaped and fled north, many joining the Union
Army as soon as they could, serving in the military not as slaves but as
free men. But the Federal Government did not admit blacks into the
military until President Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation went
86
into effect on January 1, 1863. Moreover, Alabama slaves who had
not previously fled to freedom were not enlisted in the Union Army
87
until Mobile fell in the spring of 1865. That further limited the
number of Alabama blacks who had fought in the Civil War. It also
made no difference that slaves had participated in past wars as
laborers, guides, messengers, cooks, teamsters, and hospital
attendants. They were still not deemed to have served in the armed
services within the meaning of the grandfather clause.
More than any other part of the disenfranchising scheme, the
grandfather clause, with its inherent gross preference for white
voters, cut to the heart of the Fifteenth Amendment. This is how
many opponents of the grandfather clause saw it. Frank White, one
of the four signatories to the Suffrage Committee’s minority report,
laid out the facts underpinning the constitutional objections to the
grandfather clause. “[The Alabama] descendants of those who
fought in the revolutionary war . . . the War of 1812 . . . the Indian
88
wars, they are all white men.” As for the War Between the States,
War Department records disclose that Alabama contributed only
2,750 men to the Union Army, and at least two of the regiments were
89
known to be white. On that basis, White estimated that at least
ninety-five percent of the Alabama descendants of soldiers were white
men and concluded that “[i]t is not a question of what we want. It is
90
a question of what we can do under the Federal Constitution.”
Drawing on law and lawyers for support, the delegates’ favorite
argumentative technique, White was certain that:

85. Id. at 286.
86. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2909.
I do order and declare that all persons held as slaves within said designated
States . . . are, and henceforward shall be free. . . . And I further declare and
make known that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into
the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations,
and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.
Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Sept. 22, 1862), in HENRY J.
RAYMOND, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 260-61 (1865).
87. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2909.
88. Id. at 2860.
89. Id. at 2861.
90. Id.
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every man in this Convention who is a lawyer will admit [this] is a
discrimination against the negro . . . . Your distinguished [United
States] Senator, General [Frank] Pettus, one of the best lawyers in
the South . . . investigated [a similar] provision in the Louisiana
suffrage plan . . . and gave it as his written opinion that it violated
91
the 15th Amendment.

Confederate General George Harrison, the second of the four
signatories to the minority report, joined in attacking the clause on
constitutional grounds. “[F]our of us” on the Suffrage Committee he
said, “tried to discharge our duty as confederate soldiers . . . . We are
92
all white men in this Convention, we are very largely Democrats.”
But, he added, “we owe a duty to our common country . . . the federal
93
union” as well as to our state and our political party.
Harrison
further stated that those delegates issuing the minority report
“believe this grandfather clause to be unconstitutional. So believing,
however much I love my party or love my race, I cannot support [the
94
clause] until I am satisfied that I am wrong in this opinion.” He
then put this question to the assembled delegates:
When we single out wars from the Revolution down, when the
negro was not even a citizen and could not possibly participate in
them, we simply say that these soldiers or their descendants, who
were white men, may participate . . . . Does not the negro have his
right today? And if you allow the white man to retain it, and not
the negro, pray tell me is not this discrimination. Isn’t it doing
95
indirectly what the Constitution says directly we shall not do?

Leading the attack on the grandfather clause on the convention
floor was William Oates, another signer of the minority report:
Bourbon, lawyer, former congressman, former governor, a
confederate officer with empty sleeve, mute evidence of an arm lost
96
in battle. In 1894, Oates defeated Populist candidate Reuben Kolb
for the governorship, with the help of the Democratic party’s
97
sweeping ballot machinations. While regretting that the Fifteenth
Amendment was enacted, Oates was adamant that the grandfather
98
clause violated the Constitution. “To include a class of voters on
grounds that are repugnant to the equality of rights and privileges
that are common heritage of the people, violates the spirit of the
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 2860-62.
Id. at 2849.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2851.
MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 191.
Id. at 226, 229; see supra notes 18, 20 (discussing fraud in Alabama elections).
3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2798.
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99

Constitution, if not its letter.” He asked the delegates, “suppose that
this Convention was to declare, in favor of the negro race as voters,
100
practically excluding the whites. Would that be sustainable?”
101
Answering his own question: “I think not.” He later added, “[w]e
all took an oath to support the Constitution of the United States
which says that no State shall disenfranchise any man because he is a
102
negro . . . I intend to keep my oath.”
Sharing Oates’ opinion on the unconstitutionality of the
grandfather clause was Thomas Goode Jones.
He too had
impeccable credentials: scion of an elite southern family,
Confederate major wounded four times in the war, Democratic Party
patriarch, Bourbon, celebrated lawyer and long-time counsel for the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad. He drafted the code of ethics for
the Alabama State Bar Association and became president of the Bar.
He, too, had been Governor, preceding Oates in that office from
103
1890 to 1894, and he, too, was opposed by Kolb and the Populists.
At the Alabama Constitutional Convention, Jones insisted the
grandfather clause contravened the Fifteenth Amendment.
It
applied “one test . . . to a majority of the white people, and another
test . . . to the majority of the black people; . . . our intention [is] to
enfranchise the one and disenfranchise the other! . . . How is it
possible for this act to be constitutional, in view of [the] inevitable
104
results?”
Some delegates, obviously impressed that constitutional objections
to the grandfather clause came from such distinguished quarters—
lawyer/warrior/statesmen—were swayed by this eminence to support
the Suffrage Committee’s minority report. “The minority report,”
said one delegate, “is signed by four of our number, who are known
for their legal ability, who gave it as their opinion that [the
grandfather clause] is violative of the Fifteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. Ex-governor Thomas Goode Jones, who is
acknowledged to be one of the best constitutional lawyers in the State
105
says the same thing.”
Furthermore, U.S. Senators “Morgan and
Pettus are of the same opinion, and many others of our ablest men in

99. Id. at 2791.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3105.
103. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 228.
104. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2894.
105. Id. at 3073 (quoting Joel Murphee, large landowner, merchant, and director
of the Mobile and Girard Railroad).
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106

the South agree with them on this point.”
Jones’ reputation with delegates as one of the best constitutional
lawyers in Alabama stood him in good stead. In September 1901,
shortly after the Alabama Constitutional Convention disbanded,
President Theodore Roosevelt appointed him United States Circuit
107
Court Judge for the Middle and Northern Districts of Alabama.
This was the same Thomas Goode Jones, leading light of the Alabama
Constitutional Convention, the same federal judge who, in 1903,
108
would preside over the case of Giles v. Harris.
Jackson Giles brought the suit on behalf of himself and 5,000 other
Montgomery County blacks that were exiled from the ballot box by
109
the new Alabama State Convention. Clearly, resolution of this case
would profoundly affect the future of voting rights in the United
States. In his complaint, Giles challenged, among other things, the
constitutionality of the very grandfather clause that former Governor
Thomas Goode Jones, as Convention delegate, had vigorously
110
opposed on constitutional principle.
How then in 1903, less than
two years after the Convention, did Thomas Goode Jones, now Judge
of the U.S. Circuit Court, choose to act on the complaint in that
111
crucial case before him? Quite simply. He dismissed it.
The second major point of opposition to the grandfather clause
was that it was undemocratic, reminiscent of the hereditary privileges
of the British monarchy and nobility.
It conjured up elite
prerogatives that American colonists deplored and against which they
revolted. “In the parliament of England they have hereditary peers
and another class called life peers,” a delegate explained, “but in
America we have no hereditary distinction, and cannot have any
112
unless this instrument passes and becomes ratified.”
Stanley Dent, who joined the minority report, picked up its refrain.
The grandfather clause violates “one of the great fundamental
113
doctrines of Republican Government.”
To create “an hereditary
right or privilege” is to contravene “the spirit that has animated the
people of this country from the Declaration of Independence down
114
to this time . . . .”
He further stated that the clause not only
106. Id.
107. MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 344.
108. 189 U.S. 475 (1903); see infra text accompanying note 149 (discussing the
relation of Giles v. Harris to minority voting rights in Alabama).
109. Giles, 189 U.S. at 482.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 486-88.
112. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2934.
113. Id. at 2769.
114. Id.
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conflicted with the U.S. Constitution, but that it was incompatible
with the proposed State Constitution. With no dissent, he added, the
Convention had just adopted Section 30, which declared that “‘no
title of nobility or hereditary distinction, privileges[,] honor or
emolument shall ever be granted’ . . . . Isn’t it hereditary
distinction,” Dent asked, “to say that because a man was a soldier, his
son shall be entitled to register and vote without any regard to his
115
qualifications . . . .”
Former Governor Oates joined in. The grandfather clause is “unAmerican. Why should we have any inheritable political right? Did
116
you ever hear of it before.”
Our country proceeds on the
hypothesis that “every tub stands on its own bottom . . . [t]hat is
117
Americanism.”
John Morgan, U.S. Senator from Alabama, also entered the lists
against the grandfather clause, expressing his unequivocal views in a
letter to Suffrage Committee dissenter Frank White who read the
118
letter to the Convention.
To Morgan, the grandfather clause was
counterrevolutionary. “The American revolution,” his letter began,
“was not so much about redress of grievances, as it was a struggle to
119
abolish heredity.”
The “real line of division [was] between
120
Morgan felt that forms of
Democratic and regal government.”
political heredity, such as prerogative and titular nobility, were not
only prohibited by the Constitution, but that they had also helped
instigate the Revolution. He further stated that those who would
restore political heredity discredited the cause of Revolution.
Morgan concluded his assault on the Suffrage Committee’s
“ordinance of inheritable blood” with this warning: “When such a
titled class of voters is created, it will soon occur to them that no
121
other class should be allowed to vote, and they will usurp all power.”
In addition to the distaste for unconstitutionality and the anathema
of hereditary privilege, adversaries of the grandfather clause exposed,
though with less emphasis, other fissures in its armor. They thought
it doubtful the courts would find it constitutional. The highest levels
of the judiciary were still in the hands of that “other” political party.

115. Id. at 2768-70. “In the Parliament of England they have hereditary
peers . . . but in America we have no hereditary distinctions, and cannot have any,
unless this instrument passes and becomes ratified.” Id. at 2934.
116. Id. at 2797.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2855.
119. Id. at 2862.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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General Harrison observed that the clause “will most likely be tested
in the Supreme Court of the United States, the majority of whom are
122
Moreover, if the grandfather clause fell, Harrison
Republicans.”
believed the entire suffrage plan would disintegrate with it.
Suppose the grandfather clause is held unconstitutional, what
court on earth could tell who went in under one clause or the
other? There is nothing in here providing that it shall be kept
separate. They are so intermingled that no court could tell under
which clause the voter registered.
Therefore, if one is
123
unconstitutional, the whole would be void.

The suffrage plan called for no record keeping, no permanent
chronicle of the specific suffrage provision under which each
124
successful applicant had qualified to register.
Accordingly, after
striking down the grandfather clause, a court might be forced to trash
the registration rolls completely because it could not determine who
had or had not been registered under the tainted grandfather clause;
a judicial jettison of the whole suffrage plan, particularly the
property, literacy, and poll tax requirements, was not what the
Democratic Party’s Bourbon leaders had in mind.
Another reason for abjuring the grandfather clause was the
congressional reaction it might provoke. How “do you believe,”
asked Harrison, “that a United States Congress composed of
Republicans would [decide] a closely contested Presidential election
when the vote of Alabama, Louisiana, and North Carolina, [each
having] these contested [grandfather] clauses, would settle the
125
contest?”
Responding to his own query: “Methinks, I see, fellow
delegates, a Republican Congress declaring that Alabama had not a
republican form of government and refusing to count our
126
votes . . . . [T]his is more than probable.”
Less contingent than a congressional deadlock in a close
presidential contest, was the real possibility of losing a number of
seats in the House of Representatives. In enacting the Fourteenth
Amendment, the 39th Congress authorized future Congresses,
should the need so arise, to decrease proportionally the
congressional representation of states denying any of their male
127
citizenry the right to vote.
The relevant language of the
122. Id. at 2854.
123. Id. at 2855.
124. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII.
125. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2855.
126. Id. at 2856.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted by
Congress on June 13, 1866, and, upon ratification by the states, became part of the
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Amendment did not specifically mention blacks or the vanquished
South, but the meaning was clear enough. The prospect of
congressional reduction of Alabama’s delegation to the House did
not escape General Harrison’s notice.
[A] Republican Congress is what I wish to warn you of . . . . They
are as partisan as we are and they will never submit to the
[grandfather clause] on earth. I for one cannot by my vote run any
risk on [a] proposition that I feel will place Alabama again in the
throes of reconstruction, and deprive her of her representation in
128
the Congress of the United States.

Some Bourbons fought the grandfather clause on humanitarian
grounds. It was unfair to blacks and plainly undemocratic. Former
Governor Oates was explicit on this point. “We claim a good deal for
ourselves, as being Democrats, standing on Jeffersonian Democracy,
and if we do, ought we to adopt any questionable means here in
129
order to give white man the preference over the negro?”
A
moment earlier, he had focused on the idea of ancestral privilege
130
creating an “inheritable political right” that was “un-American.”
Now at this point in the Convention, Oates took on the much more
delicate and controversial side of democracy, the issue of race.
It would be a mistake to stamp this show of concern for black
political equity by some Bourbons as hypocritical because it was quite
consistent with Bourbon paternalism. In that dazzling incongruity of
southern politics, the Bourbons were many contradictory things to
many people. They were the leaders of the party of white supremacy,
yet contemptuous and distrustful of lower class whites to whom they
pretended to curry. They were a proud, white oligarchy, yet
constantly beseeching former slaves and their progeny for electoral
support. They were patrons to individual black subordinates, fatherly
131
protectors of what they deemed to be “an inferior race”
permanently consigned by providence to their benevolent wardship.
Yet, they were willing beneficiaries of the manipulation and theft of
the black vote in the black belt by which they foiled the Populist
Constitution on July 28, 1868. Under this Amendment, a state’s total population,
male and female, was to be counted for purposes of determining its congressional
representation. Id. § 2. The Amendment did not authorize Congress to reduce any
state’s representation for denying, as every state did, the right of all black and white
women to vote. Id.
128. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2856.
129. Id. at 2797-98.
130. Id. at 2797.
131. See id. at 2793 (quoting Former Governor Oates, now Convention delegate:
“Let [Negroes] occupy a subordinate position, but do not silence them. Let the
better element of them, though an inferior race . . . go to the polls and vote.”).
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threat and clung to the levers of power. And above all, they were the
rulers of the South during the era when free black women and men
unquestionably suffered their greatest defeats.
Opponents of the grandfather clause also pondered the black
response to total black disenfranchisement and what that might
portend for stability or rebellion—social conditions that all
governments, especially those that are repressive, must seriously
contemplate. Former Governor Oates contemplated:
[the potential for disruption if they were to] completely exclude
the negro from participation—all participation—in the affairs of
our State . . . did you ever . . . know of a people, and so large a
minority not allowed any voice at all in the affairs of government
who remained contented under that government? Have you ever
heard of so large a minority, who have been admitted into the
participation of the affairs of government for thirty years, who were
afterwards silenced? Will not there be disturbances?. . . [Y]ou may
live to see the time of outbreaks and troubles not now
contemplated, such as every man who participates in making it thus
132
will live to regret.

Aside from the question of violent disturbances, blacks performed
much of the unskilled labor and no small portion of the skilled labor
133
in the South, just as they had done under slavery.
What if blacks
reacted to disenfranchisement by leaving, Oates asked.
“[W]ho . . . fixes all these telegraph and telephone poles on the
street? I have never seen a white man on those poles. The negro
134
performs nearly all of the labor down here in this country . . . .”
135
And because blacks were now “citizens of the United States,”
“[t]hey have the right to go . . . where they please . . . .” And if they
132. Id.
133. Of the approximately 120,000 skilled artisans in the South at the end of the
Civil War, it is estimated that about 100,000 were black. Bates, Black Business and the
Legacy of Racism, 21 FOCUS, No. 6, June 1993, at 3. This race-based occupational
division continued in many parts of the South after Appomattox. For instance,
blacks comprised two-thirds of Wilmington, North Carolina’s population of 25,000,
and did most of the work performed by brick masons, carpenters, mechanics, etc.
MABRY, supra note 23, at 52.
134. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2794.
135. Dred Scott v. Sanford, the juridical harbinger of the Civil War, held that no
Americans of African descent, slave or free, were citizens of the United States for any
purpose under our Constitution. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 406 (1857). That Supreme
Court calamity will never be erased from memory, though later it was disowned by
law—initially by the very first civil rights act passed by Congress after the Civil War,
Civil Rights Act of 1866, Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2000)); and then, more indelibly in 1868, by the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution: “All persons born or naturalized in
the United States and subject to jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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B. The Short, Unhappy Life of the Alabama Grandfather Clause
The grandfather clause failed miserably. The failure was not by
inadvertence in fulfilling its avowed purpose, so widely trumpeted
throughout the state—indeed, throughout the South: to safeguard
the ballot of lower/working class white men; those least able to read
and write any article of the Constitution; those to whom forty acres of
land were but a distant dream; and those whose individual personal
property, bundled altogether, did not even add up to $300, no
137
trifling sum in those deflationary days.
Alabama’s grandfather
clause did not disintegrate merely because the Supreme Court held
138
Rather, it perished under
such clauses unconstitutional in 1915.
the death blow of the very provision that created it in 1901, for
Alabama’s grandfather clause was part of the Temporary Plan, which
139
was to last only a little more than a year, until December 19, 1902.
After that date, no one could register under any of the Temporary
Plan’s three clauses—veteran, grandfather, or good character and
understanding.
This meant that registration under the grandfather clause was only
possible for white men who reached their twenty-first birthday by
December 19, 1902, made the effort to register and in fact had been
registered on or before that date. It made no difference that many of
those white men were registered voters under the 1875 Constitution
right up to the very day the 1901 Constitution replaced it. The new
Constitution simply wiped out their old registration and they were
required to register again. If men failed to re-register before
December 20, 1902, they lost the opportunity to take advantage of
the veteran, grandfather, or good character clauses. Moreover, the
grandfather clause would not be available for white men who were
not yet twenty-one on December 20, 1902; nor for previously
unregistered white men who were of age in the year 1902, but who
failed for one reason or another, to register in 1902; nor for white
men who were of age in the year 1902, but moved to Alabama after
1902; nor for white men who were born after the year 1902; nor,
presumably, for white men who reached the age of twenty-one by

136. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2794.
137. ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VIII, § 181. Its unavowed purpose was to induce
those white voters fearful of the literacy and property clauses to vote to ratify the
entire suffrage plank anyway.
138. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 364-65 (1915).
139. Supra Part I.B.
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1902, but could not then meet the Constitution’s new residency
requirement—two years in the State, one year in the county, and
140
three months in the precinct; nor for white male immigrants who
did not declare their intention to become citizens before ratification
of the new Constitution, which was on November 11, 1901, a full fifty
141
days before 1902; nor, of course, was suffrage available to any
woman in Alabama.
All in all, only a puny passage was left open for unlettered male
issue of white warriors to wend their way to the ballot box. This
stingy confinement of the grandfather clause should have come as no
surprise. On the very first day of the Convention, John Knox,
Convention President, spoke out unequivocally about the barbed
wire barrier to registration that the Bourbon majority intended to
erect. “We are pledged ‘not to deprive any white man of the right to
vote,’ but this does not extend unless this Convention chooses to
142
extend it beyond the right of voters [already of age] now living.”
Badly outgunned Convention Populists, Republicans, and a
sprinkling of Democrats, fought valiantly to stretch the Temporary
Plan’s registration period, urgently pleading for a display of greater
generosity to white men on the lower levels of the social scale.
Against this impassioned entreaty, the Bourbons stood fast; not an
extra day would they yield. They had promised poor white men a
143
bone, not a full meal.
Thus, the grandfather clause was vulnerable to withering critique.
With the clause freighted with such fetid baggage, why did most
Bourbons bother to defend it, nay insist upon it, this—the most
indefensible provision of the Suffrage Committee report? Without
the grandfather clause, the entire disenfranchising plan—literacy,
property, poll tax, etc., the whole edifice—might come tumbling
down. Ordinary white voters, fearful for the future of their franchise,
leery of Bourbon motives, might, in combination with those black
votes the Bourbons could not steal or purchase, deal a mighty death
blow to ratification. That’s how the majority of Bourbons saw it. And
it is to them we now turn.
C. The Bourbon Majority: Fathers of the Grandfather Clause
The four signatories to the Suffrage Committee’s Minority
Report—Frank White, George Harrison, William Oates, and Stanley
140.
141.
142.
143.

ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. VII, § 178.
Id. § 180.
1 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 15-16.
MCMILLAN, supra note 14, at 286-87.
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Dent—were a distinct minority of the Bourbons in their opposition to
the grandfather clause. But their honorable effort should not
unhinge
history’s
ultimate
judgment
on
southern
disenfranchisement: it was indeed the southern Bourbons, the
southern ruling elites (including these four men) who devised,
passed, and implemented the plan to disenfranchise almost all blacks
and tens of thousands of poor whites.
It must be born in mind that had these four Bourbon dignitaries
carried the day and defeated the grandfather clause, not a single
additional black man would have been added to, or kept on the
registration rolls; and thousands of poor uneducated white men
would have been unable to vote—effectively barred by the literacy
and property tests. Such a negative impact on ballot access did not
appear to trouble the foursome at all.
On the contrary, like the rest of the Bourbon delegates to the
Convention, they were the disenfranchisers; they who were socioeconomically privileged; they who in the 1870s redeemed the South
from the “evils of Reconstruction”; they who for twenty-five years
thereafter stood astride the South like some unassailable colossus;
they whose political/economic hegemony was, in those turbulent
1890s, put in jeopardy. They were not jeopardized by any branch of
the Federal Government, not by the Republican Party, not by
intrusive northerners, but by an enemy within, white and black:
untold thousands of poor farmers, joined by a band of ordinary
laborers, altogether a gaggle of Populists who no longer seemed to
know or care about their proper station, their assigned place as
servitors on the bottom rungs of the political, economic, social ladder
of the New South.
On the surface, Suffrage Committee member Richard Jones’
message was clear enough: the grandfather clause would rescue white
ballots from the perils of illiteracy. With that attractive proposition,
delegate William Handley fully agreed. “I know thousands of [young
men] personally that cannot read and write, but they are splendid
workers and pay their honest debts and they can come in under this
old soldier clause. [T]he grandfather clause . . . is the most popular
144
thing that there is . . . .”
Most popular? Not according to lawyer, later Judge, Charles
Ferguson, delegate from Birmingham in Jefferson County, Alabama’s
most populous county, dotted with iron and steel mills, iron ore and
coal mines, a focal railway center, a burgeoning metropolis teeming
144. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2878.
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with industrial workers.
“For what purpose,” he asked, “is this
grandfather clause placed in the Constitution, and why the necessity
146
of it?” Responding to his own query: “Is it not the prime purpose
147
to get votes for the Constitution?” Then pointedly: “Gentlemen [at
this Convention] argue here that the people in the hills want the
[grandfather clause] . . . Speaking for the greatest white electorate in
the State . . . I never saw such overwhelming sentiment against a
proposition in my life, as there is in the county of Jefferson against
148
this grandfather clause.”
The opposition did not prevail. The Convention approved the
grandfather clause. The voters ratified it; or so it appeared. A
Supreme Court majority, aloof to black adversity and indifferent to
disenfranchisement, black or white, dawdled over Alabama’s suffrage
149
plan in Giles v. Harris, and then, in a barely intelligible Holmes

145. As the Convention delegate from Jefferson County, Ferguson occupied a
special place. Jefferson County included the city of Birmingham. Birmingham and
Mobile were the two largest cities in Alabama at the turn of the century.
Birmingham unquestionably played a major role in Jefferson County, which had a
vast white electorate. Birmingham was highly urban and by far the most
industrialized city in Alabama, leading the nation in pig iron production. The
average wage in iron foundries was higher in Birmingham than in Alabama’s
agricultural fields. In the midst of that working culture, Jefferson County
experienced powerful labor turmoil when Northern Alabama Coal Miners walked off
the job in sympathy with the 1894 general strike call by the United Mine Workers of
America. ROGERS, supra note 5, at 93-97. Birmingham also had a large black
population. Blacks comprised between fifty-five and sixty-five percent of the
industrial labor force and occupied ninety percent of unskilled labor positions—the
hardest and lowest paid work in Birmingham. Carl V. Harris, Reforms in Government
Control of Negroes in Birmingham, Alabama 1890-1920, 38 J. S. HIST. 567, 570 (1972).
Because blacks so uniformly and vigorously opposed the grandfather clause, we may
assume that Ferguson was not unmindful of their bitter reaction to it. JOHN WHITSON
CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH
AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 162-63 (1982). As Cell puts it, “[o]nly the populist
challenge, which threatened the hegemony of both groups, eventually brought them
together.” Id. at 164. Cell also agrees with other notable scholars that “[t]he
political economy of the New South . . . had mainly class determinants.” Id. at 168.
For the political and economic role of Birmingham at the turn of the century, see
JONATHAN M. WIENER, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH: ALABAMA 1860-1885, at 16285 (1978).
146. 3 OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS, supra note 24, at 2932-33.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 189 U.S. 475 (1903). This case involved a bill of equity on behalf of black
citizens of Montgomery County, Alabama to compel the Board of Regents to enroll
them on the voting lists. Id. at 482. The plaintiffs, otherwise qualified to vote,
claimed they were arbitrarily denied registration because of their color and that
certain sections of the Alabama Constitution were inconsistent with the United States
Constitution. Id. The Court dismissed the case, stating that equity could not compel
the Court to enroll the plaintiffs under the same registration provisions they argued
were void. Id. at 484. The Court held that legislative relief, rather than judicial
action, was necessary because simply registering blacks under a flawed system would
not cure the alleged fraud. Id. at 487-88.
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opinion, refused to decide the case, a lethal blow to the
advancements of Section 1983. Equity, federal court power to issue
injunctions, was, as Holmes and the Court majority saw it, much too
frail to come to the aid of political rights, a lame and disempowering
doctrine that tenaciously persevered for years to come.
Fourteen years after the Alabama Convention, the Supreme Court
150
struck down the grandfather clause. This made little difference. It
was too late. Literacy, property, poll tax, and similar clauses, left
firmly in place, had already done their disreputable work. The
grandfather clause, part lure, part ruse, paved the way. Virtually all
blacks were now disenfranchised and so, too, were thousands of
impecunious whites in Alabama and throughout the South.
I am in agreement with John Whitson Cell that it is dangerous for
people under a republican form of government to establish a class of
151
voters to which other voters cannot attain.
Federal equity was
unavailable to heal the wounds. With the passage of time, the
situation grew worse. For the next several decades, the region
commonly referred to as the “Solid South” was a collection of oneparty states, governed generally from on-high, poor and
underdeveloped. The “Solid South” was, in many respects badly
deformed by its strong commitment to racial apartheid, elite suffrage,
malapportionment, rule by or for the upper-class, anti-trade
152
153
unionism,
and vast economic disparities.
A vital Populist
movement was no longer on the scene to arrest this development.

150. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (holding that Oklahoma
suffrage provisions violated the Fifteenth Amendment because they denied blacks
the right to vote); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (holding that Maryland
suffrage provisions violated the Fifteenth Amendment because they denied blacks
the right to vote).
151. CELL, supra note 145.
152. For the deleterious effects of racism within the southern labor movement
itself, particularly in mid-twentieth century Alabama during George Wallace’s
governorship, see Robert Norrell, Labor Trouble: George Wallace and Union Politics in
Alabama, in ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY SOUTH (Robert H. Zeiger
ed., 1991).
153. For a more upbeat view of some progressive elements in the South during
this period, see C. VANN WOODWARD, ORIGIN OF THE NEW SOUTH, 1877-1913 (1951).

